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Date when decision was rendered: 28.3.2000 Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus Reference: Report No. 0525; R98/68 Reference to source KKO 2000:45. Decisions of the Supreme Court 2000 I January-June Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2000 I januari-juni Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2000 I tammi-kesäkuu Place of publication: Helsinki Publisher: The Supreme Court Date of publication: 2000 Pages: pp. 199-211 Subject
fair trial,
presumption of innocence,
Relevant legal provisions Chapter 27, sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Penal Code; section 3 of the Radio Broadcasting Responsibility Act = strafflagen 27 kapitel 1 §, 2 §, 3 §; lag om radioansvarighet 3 § = rikoslaki 27 luku 1 §, 2 §, 3 §; radiovastuulaki 3 §. ECHR-6-2 Abstract A TV-reporter and a responsible programme editor were charged with public libel and slander and the latter also with neglecting his supervisory duties.All the court instances decided the case on the basis of the Penal Code and the Radio Broadcasting Responsibility Act and the defendants were convicted.In his concurring opinion, one judge of the Supreme Court also referred to the ECHR. Section 3 of the Radio Broadcasting Responsibility Act provides that in case a responsible programme editor is not responsible for a crime which is relating to the contents of the programme, he/she should nevertheless be convicted for having neglected his or her supervisory duties, unless he/she can show that he/she had taken all the necessary precautions in order to prevent the crime.The concurring judge found that the reversal of the burden of proof in section 3 could be criticized bearing in mind the principle of the presumption of innocence contained in Article 6-2 of the ECHR. 28.10.2002 / 10.4.2007 / RHANSKI
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Date when decision was rendered: 27.7.2004 Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus Reference: Report No. 1736; 977/1/03 Reference to source KHO 2004:73. Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2004 July-December Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2004 juli-december Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2004 heinä-joulukuu Place of publication: Helsinki Publisher: Edita Date of publication: 2008 Pages: pp. 61-71 Subject
presumption of innocence,
Relevant legal provisions section 41-2 of the Local Government Act = kommunallag 41 § 2 mom. = kuntalaki 41 § 2 mom. ECHR-6-2 Abstract The court of first instance had convicted A to a conditional sentence of imprisonment for 10 months.The court of appeal agreed with the lower court.The Supreme Court did not grant A leave to appeal.While the case was pending before the court of appeal, municipal elections were held and A was elected member of the municipal council.He was also appointed to several other positions of trust in the municipality.After the Supreme Court had rejected A's petition for leave to appeal, the municipal council decided to dismiss A from the council and from his various positions of trust.According to the Local Government Act, the council may dismiss a person elected to a position of trust if this person has after the elections been convicted by a legally valid judgment to imprisonment for a period of at least six months.B, who had voted for A in the elections, requested that the council's decision is repealed.B claimed that those who had voted for A had been aware of the conviction but had nevertheless regarded A as a suitable person to hold a position of trust in the municipality.The administrative court agreed with B.The will of the voters as expressed in the elections had to be respected, and the council could not dismiss A, despite the fact that the judgment had become legally valid after the elections. The Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision of the administrative court.It referred among other things to Article 6-2 of the ECHR and to the principle that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.The decision of the first instance court was not yet legally valid when the elections were held, and therefore, A had to be regarded as innocent at that time.In the Court's opinion, there was no decision on the basis of which the voters could have assessed A's guilt or innocence, before the judgment became legally valid.The Court concluded that the council had a right to dismiss A as A's conviction became legally valid after A had been elected to the council. Two members of the Supreme Administrative Court dissented.In their opinion, the provision of the Local Government Act only applies in case the judgment is rendered and becomes legally valid after the elections, not when the judgment is rendered before the elections but becomes legally valid after the elections.They also pointed out that the provision on the presumption of innocence could not be interpreted to the detriment of the person concerned, if, as a consequence of that interpretation, the time within which it was possible to impose administrative sanctions on a person was extended. 25.4.2005 / 16.1.2018 / RHANSKI
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Date when decision was rendered: 8.12.2005 Judicial body: Court of Appeal of Eastern Finland = Östra Finlands hovrätt = Itä-Suomen hovioikeus Reference: Report no. 1428; R05/792 Reference to source I-SHO 2005:24. Electronic database FHOT within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice Databasen FHOT inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin FHOT-tietokanta Date of publication: Subject
presumption of innocence,
police,
Relevant legal provisions Chapter 40, section 9 of the Penal Code; section 2-1 of the Police Act; section 13-2 of the Police Decree; section 14-2 of the State Civil Servants Act = strafflagen 40 kapitel 9 §; polislag 2 § 1 mom.; polisförordning 13 § 2 mom.; statstjänstemannalag 14 § 2 mom. = rikoslaki 40 luku 9 §; poliisilaki 2 § 1 mom.; poliisiasetus 13 § 2 mom.; valtion virkamieslaki 14 § 2 mom. ECHR-6-2 Abstract A, who was a policeman, had captured B and C on suspicion of theft.B and C brought charges against A for having violated his official duty because A had used offensive language when capturing B and C.The court of first instance found that when calling B and C "thieves", A had violated the presumption of innocence as prescribed in the Criminal Investigations Act and the ECHR.Considering that A had also used bad language, the court held that his behaviour was improper and violated B's and C's dignity and fundamental rights.According to the Penal Code, a violation of official duty is punishable only in cases where the act, when assessed as a whole and taking into consideration its detrimental effect and the other circumstances connected with the act, is not petty.In this case, A had been alone, it was dark and he had reason to believe that B and C were carrying a blunt weapon.The court held that, under such stressful circumstances, A had not been able to fully consider the use of appropriate language.The court also referred to earlier practice in cases where a state official had used inappropriate language and noted that in such cases the officials had at most been given an admonition and there had been no need for prosecution.The court concluded that when assessed as a whole and taking into consideration all the circumstances, A's act was petty.The charges against A were therefore dismissed.The court of appeal agreed with the first instance court.One member of the appeal court would have sentenced A to a fine, mainly because A had continued to call B and C "thieves" after the police patrol, who had been called in to assist A, had arrived and the situation had calmed down.The decision of the appeal court is final. 29.5.2006 / 9.4.2010 / RHANSKI
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Date when decision was rendered: 29.11.2006 Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus Reference: Report no. 2907; R2005/312 Reference to source KKO 2006:94. Decisions of the Supreme Court 2006 II July-December Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2006 II juli-december Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2006 II heinä-joulukuu Place of publication: Helsinki Publisher: Edita Date of publication: 2007 Pages: pp. 614-620 Subject
fair trial,
presumption of innocence,
Relevant legal provisions Chapter 9, sections 1a and 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act; Chapter 21 of the Code of Judicial Procedure = lag om rättegång i brottmål 9 kapitel 1a § och 8 §; rättegångsbalken 21 kapitel = laki oikeudenkäynnistä rikosasioissa 9 luku 1a § ja 8 §; oikeudenkäymiskaari 21 luku. ECHR-6 Abstract X was one of the defendants in a criminal case but was acquitted.Chapter 9, section 1a of the Criminal Procedure Act prescribes that if the charge of the prosecutor is rejected, the state is liable for the reasonable legal costs of the defendant.However, section 1a does not provide any methods for assessing "reasonable legal costs", and this was the issue before the Supreme Court in this case.In assessing the defendant's legal costs the lower court instances had relied on the Decree on legal aid fee criteria.In the Supreme Court's view, however, the Decree was not applicable in this case.This is because the fees and reimbursements for attorneys within the state-funded legal aid system are much smaller than the regular fees that courts may order to be reimbursed in cases that fall outside the legal aid system.In the Court's opinion, the considerations that make it possible to reimburse lower fees within the legal aid system are not applicable to reimbursement of legal costs under Chapter 9, section 1a of the Criminal Procedure Act.The Supreme Court argued instead, on the basis of Chapter 9, section 8, that the assessment of legal costs should be based on the principle of full compensation as prescribed in Chapter 21 of the Code of Judicial Procedure concerning liability for legal costs in a civil case. One partly dissenting justice of the Supreme Court argued that neither the Decree nor the Code of Judicial Procedure were applicable as a basis for assessment of legal costs in this case.In his opinion, both the wording and the preparatory works of section 1a show that it is a special provision, only concerning state liability in charges brought by the public prosecutor.The assessment of reasonable costs is then made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account not only the amount and nature of the work carried out by the acquitted defendant's counsel but also the nature of the charges and the reasons for the criminal trial.The justice pointed out that there can be many reasons for acquittal, including the fact that, in a criminal procedure, the threshold for prosecution is different from the threshold for sentencing.Taking this feature into account when assessing liability for legal costs is, in the justice's view, not contrary to the presumption of innocence as prescribed in Article 6 of the ECHR concerning fair trial.In the justice's assessment of reasonable legal costs in this case the reimbursement sum was higher than the sum ordered by the lower courts but did not quite amount to full compensation. 12.4.2007 / 14.5.2007 / RHANSKI
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Date when decision was rendered: 25.4.2006 Judicial body: Vaasa Court of Appeal = Vasa hovrätt = Vaasan hovioikeus Reference: Report no. 571; R04/1366 Reference to source Registry of the Vaasa Court of Appeal Vasa hovrätts registratorskontor Vaasan hovioikeuden kirjaamo Date of publication: Subject
freedom of expression,
respect for private life,
fair trial,
presumption of innocence,
reasonable time,
Relevant legal provisions Chapter 6, sections 7-3 and 12-4, and Chapter 24, section 10 of the Penal Code; sections 10, 12 and 21 of the Constitution Act; section 5-1-1 of the Act on the Publicity of Court Proceedings; sections 1 and 22 of the Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Media = strafflagen 6 kapitel 7 § 3 punkten och 12 § 4 punkten, 24 kapitel 10 §; grundlagen 10 §, 12 § och 21 §; lag om offentlighet vid rättegång 5 § 1 mom. 1 punkten; lag om yttrandefrihet i masskommunikation 1 § och 22 § = rikoslaki 6 luku 7 § 3 kohta ja 12 § 4 kohta, 24 luku 10 §; perustuslaki 10 §, 12 § ja 21 §; laki oikeudenkäynnin julkisuudesta 5 § 1 mom. 1 kohta; laki sananvapauden käyttämisestä joukkoviestinnässä 1 § ja 22 §. ECHR-10; ECHR-6; CCPR-19 Abstract A former tax administration officer X had published a book in which she claimed, among other things, that tax inspector Y had, in a trial which was concerning tax fraud and in which X had acted as a witness for the defence, committed perjury by swearing to the correctness of a tax audit report which in X's opinion was based on false calculations.X also claimed that there was no risk that Y herself would face trial, because her husband was a district prosecutor working at the Office of the Prosecutor General.The court of first instance convicted X for aggravated defamation and ordered that the book is forfeited and the trial documentation kept secret for a period of 15 years.X appealed to the court of appeal, which in its decision discussed at length freedom of expression as secured in Article 10 of the ECHR and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of Selistö v.Finland (judgment of 16 November 2004); Nikula v.Finland (judgment of 21 March 2002, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2002-II); Lesnik v.Slovakia (judgment of 11 March 2003, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2003-IV) and Pedersen and Baadsgaard v.Denmark (judgment of 17 December 2004, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2004-XI). The court of appeal noted that the tax administration exercises significant public powers and that legal safeguards in taxation issues had for a long time been a subject of public debate.The court saw X's book as a contribution to this debate.However, the court pointed out that freedom of expression must not overstep certain bounds with respect to the rights and reputation of others and that freedom of expression carries with it duties and responsibilities which also apply to the media even in matters of great public concern.Also, the more serious the allegation, the more solid the factual basis has to be.In this case, criticism had been directed at an ordinary tax inspector, who was not in a leading position, and it was claimed that she had committed a serious offence.No grounds had been presented in support of the allegations which had decreased Y's public credibility and violated her right to be presumed innocent.The court agreed that, as a civil servant using public authority, Y is subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism than a private individual.However, the court found that X's allegations exceeded the bounds for acceptable criticism, and that interference with X's freedom of expression was under the circumstances necessary and in accordance with the principle of proportionality. The court also ruled that there was no need to forfeit the book.Instead, the author and the printing house were ordered to remove from the book the lines which had caused X's conviction.The court also quashed the lower court's decision regarding the secrecry of the trial documentation.Finally, the court considered the length of the proceedings (six years) in the light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and found that, though the proceedings had been excessive, the delay had not caused X harm to the extent that her punishment should be reduced on account of the length of proceedings.The decision is final as leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused (decision no. 320; R2006/560, of 2 March 2007). See also Mariapori v.Finland (application no. 37751/07), judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 6 July 2010. 12.4.2007 / 3.3.2011 / RHANSKI
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Date when decision was rendered: 11.10.2005 Judicial body: Helsinki Court of Appeal = Helsingfors hovrätt = Helsingin hovioikeus Reference: Report no. 3242; R03/1733 Reference to source Registry of the Helsinki Court of Appeal Helsingfors hovrätts registratorskontor Helsingin hovioikeuden kirjaamo Date of publication: Subject
freedom of expression,
freedom of the press,
respect for private life,
fair trial,
presumption of innocence,
limitations of rights and freedoms,
Relevant legal provisions Chapter 24, section 10 of the Penal Code; sections 10 and 12 of the Constitution Act = strafflagen 24 kapitel 10 §; grundlagen 10 § och 12 § = rikoslaki 24 luku 10 §; perustuslaki 10 § ja 12 §. ECHR-6; ECHR-8; ECHR-10 Abstract X had told a small group of people, including Y, that she had been raped in a party at a hotel where a local sports team had been celebrating their national championships title.X also signed a written statement which she however withdrew the following day.She said repeatedly that she did not want to notify the police.Several months later, Y told journalist Z about the case which was then reported in a national weekly magazine.The report referred to the team in general without naming the alleged offender or offenders.The 12 players of the team sued Y, Z, the magazine and its editor-in-chief.The court of first instance sentenced the defendants to a fine for defamation and ordered them to pay damages.The court of appeal upheld the decision.In its decision, the appeal court discussed at length freedom of expression as prescribed in the Constitution Act and the ECHR.It also referred to several decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, including the cases of Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v.Norway (judgment of 20 May 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-III); Bergens Tidende and Others v.Norway (judgment of 2 May 2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-IV); Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v.Finland (judgment of 16 November 2004, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2004-X); Pedersen and Baadsgaard v.Denmark (judgment of 17 December 2004, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2004-XI); and "Wirtschafts-Trend" Zeitschriften-Verlagsgesellschaft mbH v.Austria (judgment of 14 November 2002, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2002-X). The court of appeal held that the report published in the magazine had incriminated all the players in the team and had violated their right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty by a court of law.In the court's view, the role of the media as a public watchdog was not at issue in this case, despite the fact that the police had started to investigate the alleged rape only after the report had been published.It had not been shown that the police would have tried to keep the matter secret, as claimed by the defendants, or that the police would even have been notified.The alleged rape was not generally known among the local public before it was reported in the magazine with a nation-wide circulation.In the court's view, the nature and seriousness of the alleged offence required specific accuracy in reporting the issue.However, Z and the editor-in-chief had not verified the accusations in order for the report to rely on a reliable factual basis.The court concluded that in this case restricting the defendants' freedom of expression was necessary in order to protect the players' honour and their right to be presumed innocent.In assessing the damages, the court referred to the principle of proportionality and the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 13 July 1995, Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A, Vol. 316).It found that the damages ordered by the first instance court were reasonable.The decision of the court of appeal is final.The Supreme Court did not grant leave to appeal in the case (decision no. 1117; R2005/1142, of 15 May 2006). When the court of appeal gave its decision, the police investigation of the alleged offence was still pending.In its investigations, the police found no evidence of rape.X never reported the alleged offence and she did not want to be heard at the proceedings referred to above. See also Ruokanen and Others v.Finland (application no. 45130/06), judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 6 April 2010. 13.4.2007 / 19.10.2010 / RHANSKI
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